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BACKGROUND
Guidance on designing cost-effective
examinations and on interpretation of
expert observations has been available
since the late 1990s in the form of a model
framework called Case Assessment and
Interpretation (CAI) (Cook et al., 1998a,b;
Jackson and Jones, 2009). The underlying
principles of the guidance were subse-
quently encoded in a published standard
written by the Association of Forensic
Science Providers (AFSP, 2009) and have
been incorporated in draft guidance
from the European Network of Forensic
Science Institutes (ENFSI). The guid-
ance is predicated on a logical approach
to the evaluation of evidence, requiring
examiners to have an understanding and
acceptance of the laws of probability. A
key element in such an evaluation is the
assessment of a likelihood ratio (LR) as
the basis of providing logical, balanced,
robust, expert opinion.
In addition to the use of an LR
approach, a second notion, that of the
hierarchy of issues, is a vital element of
evaluation. The hierarchy of issues is a
scheme that helps identify the case issue
that the expert evidence is addressing and
thereby clarifies the contribution that evi-
dence is making to the judicial process
(Cook et al., 1998b; Evett et al., 2000;
Jackson et al., 2006). Using the hierar-
chy, case issues are classified as belonging
to one of four levels—“offence,” “activity,”
“source,” or “sub-source” (Jackson, 2009).
This article discusses how commercial-
ization of forensic services, whilst not pos-
ing any immediate threat to an evaluation
of an LR for scientific evidence, does pose a
risk of misleading evidence being adduced
if the issue being addressed by the scien-
tist is at too low a level in the hierarchy of
issues.
THE HIERARCHY AND DNA EVIDENCE
Most DNA cases are reported at, and
therefore help the fact-finder (not the sci-
entist) to address issues at a source or
sub-source level. If a DNA-profile from a
questioned sample can be attributed with
a high degree of confidence to a par-
ticular body-fluid stain or material, then
the results of DNA-profiling help address
the issue of the source of the body-fluid.
However, if the DNA-profile cannot be
attributed with confidence to a particu-
lar body-fluid, then the DNA results help
address only the origin of the DNA, i.e.,
a sub-source issue. In a way analogous to
Bayesian networks, consideration of sub-
source and source level issues then feed
into, and inform, consideration of activ-
ity level issues and, ultimately, offence level
issues.
In some cases, the probative force of
matching DNA-profiles for sub-source and
source level issues transfers directly, and
largely unchanged, to the probative force
at activity level, and possibly also to
offence level. As an example, consider a
case in which a defendant was being tried
on a charge of rape. A DNA-profile had
been obtained from semen-bearing vagi-
nal swabs taken from the complainant
within a few hours of the incident. The
profile was found to match that of the
defendant. He denies the allegation and
declared that he did not know, and had
never met, the complainant. Let us assume
that the defense are not challenging the
prosecutions contentions that:
(1) The complainant had been raped by
someone.
(2) The semen on the vaginal swabs was
that of the offender, whomever that
may have been.
(3) The DNA-profile obtained from the
swabs can be attributed with confi-
dence to the semen on the swabs.
In these circumstances, the probative
force, in terms of an LR of the order 1
billion provided by the matching DNA-
profiles at sub-source level, translates
unchanged to a probative force of 1 billion
at offence level. Whilst the scientist should
preferably be focusing on activity level, she
could report the LR at sub-source, source
or activity level and there would be little,
if any, risk that the court would be misled
about the probative force that the match-
ing DNA-profiles provide at offence level,
i.e., 1 billion.
Compare that case with one of a bur-
glary in which a scarf was found at the
scene. The occupants of the attacked prop-
erty say that the scarf was not present
when they left the premises and it must
therefore be a reasonable, but not cer-
tain, assumption that the scarf was left by
the burglar(s). The scarf was in a dirty,
well-worn condition and it bore one small
bloodstain. No other blood was found at
the scene. DNA-profiling of material cut
from the bloodstain on the scarf gave a
weak DNA-profile and that was subse-
quently found to match a suspect. He had
no fixed address but shared various flats
and “squats” with a number of vagrants
and known criminals, often sharing items
of clothing. He denied the burglary and
said that he couldn’t recall wearing a scarf
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like the one at the scene but did say that he
had occasionally worn scarves in the past
but that he was not a habitual wearer. No
other DNA-analyses were performed to see
what other DNA-profiles were present or,
indeed, whether the suspect’s profile was
also present on other non-bloodstained
areas of the scarf. Therefore, there is signif-
icant uncertainty that the profile could be
attributed to the bloodstain. Let us assume
that the scientist in this case evaluated
and reported the matching DNA-profiles
at sub-source level, i.e., helping to address
the sub-source issue of “from whom has
the DNA originated?” Given a full, match-
ing profile, the scientist reported the LR
of a billion as providing “extremely strong
support for a view that the DNA origi-
nated from the suspect rather than from an
unknown, unrelated person.” Without fur-
ther explanation by the scientist, or guid-
ance from the prosecution, this “value”
at sub-source level could be taken by
the court and applied erroneously to the
“value” that the matching DNA-profiles
provided in addressing the offence level
issue of whether the suspect committed the
burglary. If the scientist wanted to pro-
vide more effective, more balanced and
robust help to the court, then she should
be evaluating and reporting the matching
DNA-profiles at activity level, as required
by the AFSP standard and CAI principles.
In this last case, specifying an activity
level issue would not be a trivial mat-
ter. There were no witnesses to the crime
and therefore there are no clear activities
that constitute the crime and which relate
to the scarf. Perhaps the best that scien-
tist could offer would be to consider an
issue of whether the suspect was a habitual
wearer of the scarf. A pair of appropriate
propositions based on the prosecution and
defense positions, and conditioned on the
relevant background circumstances of the
case, could be defined along the lines of:
HP—The suspect is a habitual wearer of
the scarf.
HD—The suspect is not a habitual
wearer of the scarf; someone else is the
habitual wearer.
Of course there are problems with defin-
ing what “habitual” means in terms of the
length of time and the degree of contact
that would be classified as “habitual” but
let us assume that these variables had been
defined broadly. There is also the issue of
whether the scarf had been worn habitu-
ally by anyone at all. Again, let us assume
it would be accepted that it had been
worn in such a way. Given sufficient, reli-
able knowledge of transfer, persistence and
detection of DNA-profiles, and on back-
ground levels of DNA-profiles, then the
scientist may be able to assign probabilities
for her observations given the truth of the
competing propositions. The observations
should include not only the “match” of the
profiles but also the quantity and distribu-
tion of DNA across the scarf. However, in
this case, there is only the observation of
a “match”; there is no information on the
quantity or distribution of DNA-profiles
across the scarf. The scientist is therefore
unable to evaluate robustly an LR at this
activity level and, in turn, the court does
not have the expert help it requires in order
to evaluate properly, at offence level, the
DNA evidence that has been provided at
sub-source level.
Evaluation at activity level of cases in
which there is uncertainty on:
– The attribution of the matching profile
to a specific body-fluid.
– The relevance to the offence of the
matching profile.
– The background presence of the
matching profile.
will inevitably mean that the LR pro-
vided by matching DNA-profiles at sub-
source level, typically of the order 1 bil-
lion, will be reduced, sometimes markedly,
when that evidence is evaluated at activ-
ity and offence levels. Evett et al. (2002)
provide examples of two such cases while
Biedermann and Taroni (2011) provide a
thorough analysis of the relationships and
dependencies of the variables involved.
PRACTICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES
From anecdotal evidence, particularly
from experts working on behalf of the
defense, there appears to be a large num-
ber of cases, if not the majority of cases,
reported at sub-source level with very
powerful LRs. However, a significant num-
ber require more sophisticated appraisal
at activity level in order that the court is
not misled on the probative force of the
matching DNA-profiles.
In the English and Welsh jurisdiction,
police forces pay private companies for
the provision of forensic science services.
Essentially, under the terms of contracts
between the police and the providers,
an evaluation of an LR for activity level
propositions is generally more costly than
for an evaluation at sub-source level. Even
if the police or prosecution realize they
need an evaluation at activity level, bud-
getary considerations may deter a request
for such an evaluation. Furthermore, even
though the AFSP standard requires the
scientist to consider activity level, and to
advise the customer of the importance
of doing so, there is little evidence that
providers are able, or willing, to follow
that requirement. This may be because the
police have submitted for analysis only a
sample, such as a swab or piece of fabric,
taken from a larger item, depriving the sci-
entist of vital information on the quantity
and distribution on that larger item that is
necessary for evaluation at activity level.
Providing an evaluation of an LR only
at sub-source or source level deprives the
court of important information that, in
some case, has a direct bearing on the
decision of whether the defendant is guilty.
Arguably, many defendants simply
plead guilty in the face of expert reports
that contain the acronym “DNA” and the
figure “1 billion.” This may be because
they truly are guilty, or it may be because
their lawyers advise them to do so. Or it
may be because, while the defendant is
innocent, both the defendant and his/her
lawyer do not realize that they can chal-
lenge this apparently overwhelming figure
and that a proper appraisal of the evidence
at a more appropriate level would result in
much less powerful probative force.
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